The Weak Rationality Principle in Economics by Gebhard Kirchgässner













  The Weak Rationality Principle in 
Economics 
   
  Gebhard Kirchgässner 
  
  December 2004 Discussion paper no. 2004-13 
 
 
 Editor:  Prof. Jörg Baumberger 
University of St. Gallen 
Department of Economics 
Bodanstr. 1 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  ++41 71 224 22 41 









Forschungsgemeinschaft für Nationalökonomie 
an der Universität St. Gallen 
Dufourstrasse 48 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  ++41 71 224 23 00 



















   
 

















Mailing Address:  Professor Dr. Gebhard Kirchgässner 
University of St. Gallen 
SIAW-HSG 
Bodanstrasse 8 




                                       
*Paper presented at the Workshop on "Rationality and Commitment", University of St. Gallen, May 13 - 15, 
2004. - Revised Version, September 2004..  
Abstract 
The weak rationality principle is not an empirical statement but a heuristic rule how to 
proceed in social sciences. It is a necessary ingredient of any ￿understanding’ social 
science in the Weberian sense. In this paper, first this principle and its role in eco-
nomic theorizing is discussed. It is also explained why it makes sense to use a micro-
foundation and, therefore, employ the rationality assumption in economic models. 
Then, with reference to the ￿bounded rationality’ approach, the informational assump-
tions are discussed. Third, we address the assumption of self-interest which is often 
seen as a part of the rationality assumption. We conclude with some remarks of hand-
ling the problems of ￿free will’ as well as ￿weakness of the will’ within the economic 
approach. 
Zusammenfassung:  
Das schwache Rationalitätsprinzip in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
Das schwache Rationalitätsprinzip ist keine empirisch gehaltvolle Behauptung sondern 
eher eine heuristische Regel, wie man in den Sozialwissenschaften vorgehen soll. Es ist 
notwendiger Bestandteil jeder ,verstehenden‘ Sozialwissenschaft im Sinne von MAX 
WEBER. In dieser Arbeit wird zunächst dieses Prinzip und seine Rolle im Rahmen der 
ökonomischen Theoriebildung diskutiert. Dabei wird auch erläutert, weshalb es Sinn 
macht, eine Mikro-Fundierung ökonomischer Modelle anzustreben, die rationales Ver-
halten der Akteure unterstellt. Mit verweis auf den Ansatz ,eingeschränkter Rationalität‘ 
werden die Informationsannahmen dieses Ansatzes erörtern. Dann behandeln wir die 
Annahme des Eigeninteresses, die häufig als Bestandteil der Rationalitätsannahme 
(miss-)verstanden wird. Die Arbeit schliesst mit einigen Bemerkungen zur Behandlung 
der Probleme des freien Willens sowie der Willensschwäche im Rahmen des ökono-
mischen Verhaltensmodells. 
Keywords 
Rationality, Self Interest, Micro-Foundation, Bounded Rationality 
JEL Classification 
B41 1 Introduction 
It is hardly disputed that economics is the most important social science which explains hu-
man behaviour as ‘ rational choice’ or ‘rational behaviour’. The rational choice approach is, 
of course, also applied in other social sciences like political science or sociology, but it is far 
less dominant and much more disputed there. There is much less unanimity about what ‘ra-
tionality’ means: The interpretations go from the strict application of expected utility theory 
as developed by J. V. NEUMANN and O. MORGENSTERN (1944) via full rationality and boun-
ded rationality in the sense of H.A. SIMON (1955), the assumption that rationality simply im-
plies “that agents are not in fact stupid” (M. LAGUEUX (2004, p. 31)) up to the weak rational-
ity principle discussed in this paper. Along this line the empirical content of the rationality 
assumption decreases: It is highest for the expected utility theory but zero for the weak ration-
ality principle. 
When the content of the rationality assumption is discussed, one point is whether it is used in 
a purely instrumental (formal) sense as “Zweckrationalität” or whether is has some material 
content, i.e. whether only the means are (or should be) rationally chosen in order to reach cer-
tain goals or whether the goals themselves should be rationally justified. J. HABERMAS (1964), 
e.g., accused H. ALBERT (1964) of a “positivistically halved rationalism” because he insisted 
on the classical dichotomy between facts and standards, i.e. that it is not possible to provide 
value judgements with the same scientific justification (status) as statements about facts.  
Following the classical model “that deliberation is always about means, never about ends” 
(J.R.  SEARLE (2001, p. 5)), in economics, usually a formal rationality assumption is em-
ployed; the idea behind this is the autonomy of the person or the ‘consumer sovereignty’, i.e. 
that individuals are free to choose their own values; nobody has the right to tell them how 
their preference function has to look like.
1) But even then, there is a wide leeway for different 
concepts of rationality. They concern especially (i) the content (and structure) of the individ-
ual utility function and (ii) the information which is used by the individual and how it is used 
by her/him. While the latter is mainly subject of the concepts of ‘bounded rationality’ as de-
veloped by H.A. SIMON (1955) and R.A. HEINER (1983), the former mainly centres around the 
notion of self-interest.  
Every strong version of the rationality principle has been empirically rejected. This becomes 
especially obvious if the empirical results of game theory are taken into account.
2) Laboratory 
experiments show that people do neither behave according to the predictions of non-co-
operative nor of co-operative game theory; they especially contradict the notion of self-
interest which is applied in the formal models. Thus, not only the information problem is 
                                                           
  1. This does, of course, not imply that nobody has the right to tell the autonomous individuals how to behave 
properly; it is undisputed in economics that the community has (up to a certain extent) the right to set the 
rules of the social living together and, by this way, to restrict the behavioural leeway of the individuals.  
  2. See for this, e.g., R. SELTEN (1990). – 2 – 
tackled today by the concepts of bounded rationality but also the motivation of acting indi-
viduals. 
The empirical rejection of rationality concepts goes even further. Even in situations which 
largely favour (traditionally) rational behaviour people often (and consistently) behave differ-
ently; starting with the ALLAIS-paradox of 1953
3) many anomalies of individual behaviour 
have been discovered, and some of them relate to the behaviour on financial markets; institu-
tions which are usually assumed to punish non-rational behaviour quite heavily. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence, e.g., for Monday effects, excess volatility and the winner’s curse.
4) More-
over, tests whether the individuals have rational expectations in the sense of J.E. MUTH (1961) 
usually reject this assumption.  
This does not necessarily imply, however, that such versions of the rationality principle 
should generally not be applied in economic analysis. In order to reject a theory it is not only 
necessary that it is falsified but also that a ‘better’ theory is available for the purpose at hand. 
Moreover, especially with respect to the rational expectations assumption it has to be taken 
into account that this is the most parsimonious way to construct macroeconomic models 
which do not imply that the individuals can be fooled consistently and/or in the long run in 
the same way. Even though the rational expectations hypothesis has often been rejected in 
empirical research
5) and even though there is evidence for the existence of money illusion,
6) it 
hardly makes sense to evaluate different possibilities of economic policies under the assump-
tion that money illusion exists in the long-run, i.e. that (rational) individuals do not learn. 
The topic of this paper is, however, the weakest possible version of the rationality principle. 
Contrary to the strong versions, this principle cannot be rejected by empirical evidence; it is 
rather a methodological advice than an empirical statement. But it is, as we will see, neverthe-
less one basic and necessary ingredient of any ‘understanding’ social science in the Weberian 
sense. Social sciences can get along without it, but not understanding ones in this sense.  
Other basic ingredients are assumptions about the objectives of the individuals and about the 
information they have at hand and use. Together, they build the economic model of behav-
iour. All this is based, of course, on the concept of methodological individualism, i.e. on the 
assumption that the different individuals, the human persons, are those who act, even if they 
perform ‘common actions’. This provides a micro-foundation for economic but also for other 
theories of the society. Other concepts of social sciences which do not include such a micro-
foundation do not have to employ the (weak) rationality assumption.  
In the following, first the weak rationality principle and its role in economic theorizing is dis-
cussed (Section 2). It is also discussed why it makes sense to use a micro-foundation and, 
                                                           
  3. For the history of the Allais-Paradox see P.J.H. SCHOEMAKER (1982, pp 541ff.). 
  4. See, e.g., the corresponding chapters in R.H. THALER (1992). 
 5.  See,  e.g.,  G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1993). 
  6. See, e.g., E. FEHR und J.-R. TYRAN (2001). – 3 – 
therefore, employ the rationality assumption in economic models. Then, with reference to the 
‛bounded rationality’ approach, the informational assumptions are addressed (Section 3). 
Third, we discuss the assumption of self-interest which is often seen as a part of the rational-
ity assumption (Section 4). We conclude with some remarks of handling the problems of ‛free 
will’ as well as ‛weakness of the will’ in the economic approach. 
2  The Rationality Principle 
In economic analysis, the individual’s decision situation is essentially described by two ele-
ments: by preferences and restrictions. Both elements are strictly differentiated in the eco-
nomic analysis.
7) In a given situation the restrictions limit the individual’s leeway of action; to 
these restrictions belong, besides others, the income of the individual, the market prices of 
goods, the legal frame of his actions but also the (expected) reactions of other individuals. 
Within this leeway there are the various alternatives of acting which are available and from 
which the individual can choose. It is not necessary that the individual knows all alternatives. 
Generally, he only knows part of his choices and often only a very limited one, and he is 
aware only of some of their consequences. Before taking a decision he must, therefore, evalu-
ate these alternatives; he has to build up (conditional) expectations or forecasts.
8) Nearly al-
ways one of the alternatives is to postpone the decision and to search for additional informa-
tion in order to increase the knowledge about possible actions and their consequences. The 
preferences are derived from the intentions of the individual, they reflect the individual’s 
ideas of value as they have been developed during the process of socialisation, and they are 
principally independent of the actual possibilities of action. According to these preferences, 
the individual assesses the various alternatives at his disposal, he weighs up the pros and cons, 
the costs and benefits of the alternatives against each other and finally chooses that (those) 
alternative(s) which come(s) closest to his preferences or which promise(s) to bring about the 
maximum net benefit.
9) Thus, in this model, human behaviour is interpreted as a rational 
choice from available alternatives by the individual or – to speak in the language of econom-
ics – as ‘utility maximisation under constraints with uncertainty’.
10) 
Two issues are important for considering an individual’s decision within the framework of the 
economic model of behaviour: the independence of the decision and the rationality of the de-
                                                           
  7. The economic approach differs in this respect from other approaches in the social sciences which do not 
make this distinction at all or at least not so strictly, as, e.g., traditional sociology. 
   8. H. ESSER (1996) denotes this the “definition of the situation” which precedes every action. 
   9. JOHN RAWLS who calls this concept “the standard one familiar in social theory” remarks that “in the usual 
way, a rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He 
ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy 
more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully executed.” 
(1971, p. 143.) 
 10. As the individuals’ behaviour is oriented toward the (potential) consequences of the various possible ac-
tions, one also speaks of a ‘consequentialist’ approach in this context. See for this, e.g., A.K. SEN and B. 
WILLIAMS (1982). – 4 – 
cision. Independence of a decision means that an individual acts according to his own prefer-
ences (and not according to the preferences of others). Of course, he can take into account the 
interests of others in his preferences; in an extreme case he can be envious or malevolent, but 
also altruistic and benevolent.  
The second point is the rationality of the decision. In this context rationality does not mean 
that the individual chooses the optimum way of acting at every moment, that he goes through 
the world like a walking computer which always finds out the best of all available alternatives 
in a flash. This distorted picture of the ‘homo oeconomicus’ which up to now is still to be 
found in many (text)books of microeconomics and which has rightly been criticised again and 
again, is not in line with the modern interpretations of the economic model of behaviour.
11) 
Rationality in this model simply means that the individual, following his intentions, is princi-
pally in a position to assess and evaluate his action range and then to act accordingly.
12) It has 
to be taken into account, however, that the individual must make his decision without being 
fully informed and that the search for additional information is costly. He also often has to 
decide under time pressure. The individual will especially be willing to accept costs for addi-
tional information if he realises a relevant change of his action leeway and he, therefore, has 
to assess and evaluate his alternatives once again. A rational individual reacts to such a 
change ‘systematically’, i.e. neither by chance nor randomly, but also not strong traditionally 
in that he strictly sticks to given rules independent of the concrete situation.
13) Therefore, his 
behaviour can systematically be influenced by providing incentives, which in most cases re-
sult from changes of the individual’s action leeway (his restrictions). Thus, in this concept, 
philosophically meaningful and often discussed, distinction between human behaviour and 
human action disappears: Behaviour of individuals is explained by assuming that they act 
rationally.
14) As a consequence, predictions of behavioural changes as a reaction to changes of 
his action leeway are possible. 
M. WEBER adopts a similar if not even the same position when he writes about social behav-
iour: “It will be called human ‘behaviour’ only insofar as the person or persons involved en-
gage in some subjectively meaningful action. Such behaviour may be mental or external; it 
may consist in action or omission to act. The term ‘social behaviour’ will be reserved for ac-
                                                           
 11. For criticism of this concept of rationality see also K.J. ARROW (1986). 
 12. J.W.N. WATKINS gives a similar definition of the ‘principle of rationality’ which he, however, calls “just 
rough and provisional”: “An individual is placed in a certain objective problem-situation. He has certain 
aims (wants, preferences) or perhaps a single aim, and he makes a factual appraisal (which may be a mis-
appraisal) of his problem-situation. The rationality principle says that he will act in a way that is ‘appropri-
ate’ to his aim(s) and situational appraisal.” (1970, p. 172). He explicitly refers the term ‘appropriate’ to 
K.R. POPPER (1967).  
 13. For the discussion of such kinds of ‘irrational’ behaviour see G.S. BECKER (1962) as well as, referring to 
him, J. ELSTER (1979, p. 137 ff.). 
 14. See also G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1985) for this. This position is, of course, not uncontested. A different view is 
especially taken by those authors who combine with the term ‘action’ a moral demand as, e.g., B.M. PAT-
ZAK (1984). – 5 – 
tivities whose intent is related by the individuals involved to the conduct of others and is ori-
ented accordingly.” (1922, p. 1.) 
In other words, within the framework of the economic model of behaviour, individuals are 
supposed to adapt to changed environmental conditions according to their objectives (prefer-
ences) in a systematic and therefore predictable manner. Such changes can result both from 
the actions of other individuals’, e.g., by political measures, as well as through changes of the 
‘natural’ conditions. This is formulated as a principle by H. KLIEMT as follows: “Every inten-
tional human behaviour is to be explained as individual adaptive behaviour guided by prefer-
ences.” (1984, p. 17.) 
According to the logic of science, this ‘weak principle of rationality’ might, as a basis for the 
economic model of behaviour, be of similar importance for the social sciences as the ‘princi-
ple of causality’ for the natural sciences.
15) In the same way as in natural sciences talking 
about (natural) laws does not become possible before accepting the principle of causality, in 
the social sciences the understanding of human actions is not possible if the distinction be-
tween preferences and restrictions (purposes and means) which is embedded in the economic 
model of behaviour is not accepted and if it is not presupposed that the individuals use the 
means at their disposal in a (subjectively) rational way to reach their objectives.  
It is interesting that not only the ‘new economic history’ as represented, e.g., by D.C. NORTH  
(1981), but also the traditional ‘understanding’ branch of history applies exactly this ‘eco-
nomic’ model of behaviour and, therefore, also the underlying rationality principle, although 
history and (theoretical) economics seem to be methodologically at a far distance from each 
other at first sight.
16) In this context, e.g., J.W.N.  WATKINS writes about the principle of 
rationality: “But the principle can also be cast in the form of a methodological rule that 
enjoins historians and other investigators of human behaviour, not necessarily to accept the 
principle qua factual postulate as true, but to proceed on the supposition that it is true. In this 
last form … it says, first of all, that to provide a conjectural explanation for a past action is to 
postulate a decision-scheme which has a practical conclusion of which that action could be 
the natural outcome.” (1970, p. 209.) 
Regarding it this way, the weak rationality principle is not an empirical statement; it can nei-
ther be verified nor falsified. Whenever an action of an individual is observed, it might be 
rational in the sense described above even if we (at the moment) do not understand it, but 
even if we would have a ‘rational’ explanation for every observed action we could never be 
                                                           
 15. See for this also K.R. POPPER (1967), M. TIETZEL (1981, p. 131 ff.), B. ABEL (1983, p. 133 ff.) and, for a 
somewhat different position, S.J. LATSIS (1983). Of course, the principle of causality can also be under-
stood differently. (As to the importance of the principle of causality see, e.g., W. STEGMÜLLER (1960) as 
well as especially M. BUNGE (1959)). Moreover, the analogy between the principle of rationality and the 
principle of causality is restricted. Whereas, e.g., the principle of rationality can also be and is often com-
prehended in a normative sense, this trivially does not apply to the principle of causality. 
 16. This is apparently underlined by the battle of methods (‘Methodenstreit’) started by C. MENGER (1883) 
between his (Austrian) theoretical school and G. SCHMOLLER’s historical school of political economy. (See 
for this, e.g., J.A. SCHUMPETER (1954, p. 814f.).)  – 6 – 
sure that it really holds for all human actions. Insofar, it is a metaphysical statement. Its pur-
pose is, however, not to tell us something about the reality; it is a heuristic principle which 
gives us methodological guidance for the way we are doing research in the social sciences. It 
tells us that, whenever we want to explain human behaviour, we should try to explain it as 
rational actions of the individuals or as the result of rational decisions, respectively.
17) 
This is somewhat contrary to K.R. POPPER’s view of the rationality principle. On the one 
hand, there is at best a minor disagreement about the content of the principle and its impor-
tance for the social sciences. He classifies the economic approach as “a purely objective 
method in the social sciences which may well be called the method of objective understand-
ing, or situational logic.” (1962, p. 199). At another place he calls this procedure “situational 
analysis” (1972, p. 178). He defines the rationality principle as “the principle of acting appro-
priately to the situation” (p. 359). On the other hand, there is some disagreement about the 
status of this principle. Though he acknowledges that it is “clearly an almost empty principle” 
(1967, p. 359), he believes that it has some empirical content and therefore, can (in principle) 
be tested. Mentioning prima facie evidence he claims that “the rationality principle is false” 
(1967, p. 361). Nevertheless, he also acknowledges its heuristic value.
18) 
If this behavioural model, as it is supposed here, is seen as prerequisite for understanding hu-
man action, the difference between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’ disappears: I can only 
understand human action if I can explain it by means of such a model of rational behaviour. 
M. WEBER who usually is attributed to the ‘understanding’ branch of the social sciences, puts 
this into similar words. He looks at sociology as “that science which aims at the interpretative 
understanding of social behaviour in order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course, and 
its effects.” (1922, p.1.)
19) This also corresponds to our ordinary language usage of ‘under-
standing’ of human behaviour. Here we also think in categories of motives (preferences), 
means (restrictions) and limited information.
20) 
An individual might rationally act in this sense even if he does – according to our everyday’s 
perceptions – rather crazy things. Someone, e.g., who is schizophrenic and believes that he is 
another person and/or in a totally different situation, might be ‘rational’ in this sense, given 
his (totally wrong) perception of the reality. Moreover, we can only understand him if we – 
underlying his perception – ask why he behaved in this and that way. As soon as we ask 
“why” we usually assume that he believed to have ‘reasons’ for his behaviour and, corre-
spondingly, applied the weak rationality principle. 
                                                           
 17. See also V. VANBERG (2004, p. 3): “Interpreted as a heuristic principle, the rationality principle tells us how 
we should go about explaining purposeful human action. It suggests that we ought to explain such action in 
terms of the actor’s purposes and beliefs, and that we should do so under the presumption that the actor’s 
purposes and beliefs are consistent at the moment of choice.” 
 18. For a discussion and a critique of K.R. POPPER’s conception of the social sciences see V. VANBERG (1975, 
pp. 109ff.), M. SCHMID (1979, 1979a) as well as D.W. HANDS (1985). 
 19. As to MAX WEBER’s position see, e.g., E. ANGEHRN (1983). 
 20. For the discussion of the term ‘understanding’ in social sciences see e.g. W. STEGMÜLLER (1969, p. 360 
ff.), A. BÜHLER (1987) as well as the contributions in G. SCHURZ (1988). – 7 – 
The only ‘strong’ assumption in this concept is the one of consistency (at the moment of 
choice): Preferences are assumed to be insofar complete as the individual is assumed to be 
able to principally evaluate any alternative which he takes into account as a possibility, and 
also to be transitive. Without this assumption, we cannot ‘understand’ what an individual 
does. But even this assumption is not testable if we do not assume that the preferences are 
more or less constant over time. Actions at different points of time which seem to be inconsis-
tent might be consistent if the individual learns and/or has only limited information process-
ing capacity. Moreover, learning (and forgetting) might change the individual’s behaviour 
over time in a way that seems to be inconsistent. Thus, consistency over time is a (necessary) 
assumption when revealed preference analysis is to be applied, but it is not a necessary com-
ponent of the rationality assumption.
21) 
Applying the economic model of behaviour is, of course, by far not the only way social sci-
ences can proceed. Methodological individualism and the rationality assumption are not nec-
essary elements of any social science. Correspondingly, a micro-foundation is not a necessary 
ingredient of any social theory.
22) Macro-theories can be developed which discuss, e.g., the 
properties of social systems and the relations between those properties which do not need a 
micro-foundation and, therefore, also do not need to apply the weak rationality principle. This 
also holds for economics, especially because economics is hardly interested in the behaviour 
of single individuals but in the behaviour of so-called ‘aggregates’ such as, e.g., consumers, 
entrepreneurs, or voters. It is not the behaviour of a certain single individual which is interest-
ing, but the ‘typical’ behaviour is considered: regularities in the behaviour of all or at least the 
majority of the individuals in the respective group.
23) Here, the micro-theory offers (only) the 
basis in order to be able to explain the macro-phenomena. 
This is not a contradiction, as it might seem at first glance. If by change of a certain macro-
variable the conditions for the actions of all individuals of a certain group are influenced in a 
similar way, it is to be expected that their reaction will not in every single case, but on aver-
age, show that regularity which can be explained by the individual decision calculus. Thus, a 
rise in petrol prices will, e.g., not induce every car-driver – ceteris paribus – to save petrol. 
For the economic way of reasoning it is, however, only relevant that on average, consumers 
react with savings so that the rise in prices leads to a reduction of the total demanded quantity. 
This behaviour, which actually could be observed after the high increases of petrol prices in 
the years 1973/74 and 1979/80, can – by using some additional ‘weak’ assumptions – be de-
                                                           
 21. See, e.g., R. SUDGEN (1985). 
 22. For a discussion of the two sociologies, the one with and the other without such a micro-foundations, see V. 
VANBERG (1975). 
 23. Correspondingly, J.R. HICKS writes when dealing with the law of demand: “In all our discussions so far, we 
have been concerned with the behaviour of a single individual. But economics is not, in the end, much in-
terested in the behaviour of single individuals. Its concern is with the behaviour of groups. A study of indi-
vidual demand is only a means to the study of market demand.” (1939, p. 34.) – See for this also F.A. v. 
HAYEK (1952, p. 48 ff.) as well as K.R. POPPER (1967, p. 3).  – 8 – 
rived for the ‘typical’ consumer from the individual optimality calculus of the theory of con-
sumer behaviour. 
Whether a micro-foundation is necessary for economic theories has, e.g., been discussed in 
the seventies.
24) Macro-relations based on arguments of plausibility were accepted as long as 
they seemed to be empirically valid; the latter had to be ‘proven’ – using econometric meth-
ods – by statistical significance. Economic policy was performed by relying on the existence 
and stability of such relations. 
The most famous example for such a relation is probably the modified Phillips-curve which 
contains a long-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment. It was first ‘discovered’ 
by A.W. PHILLIPS (1958) as a relation between the unemployment and real wage develop-
ment. Later on, it was expanded into a relation between inflation and unemployment. In 1960 
it was called the “menu of choice” of economic policy by P.A. SAMUELSON and R.M. SOLOW 
(1960, p 192). Such Phillips-curves, named after their ‘discoverer’, were econometrically es-
timated for quite a number of countries. On the basis of this empirical evidence it was be-
lieved that the unemployment rate could permanently be reduced through a once for all in-
crease of the inflation rate.
25)  
Such macroeconomic relations – respectively the macroeconometric models consisting of 
them – can in many cases be helpful instruments for predictions. This can change, however, if 
one tries to simulate with such models the effects of different economic policies and to put 
into practice those economic measures which (according to the political decision-makers) will 
lead to the ‘best’ result. Then it might happen that a macroeconomic relation which ought to 
be exploited for economic policy purposes disappears. If, e.g., a politician wants to make use 
of the (statistically validated) long-term relation between inflation and unemployment by in-
creasing inflation through a policy of easy money in order to reduce unemployment, this 
might perhaps be successful in the short run. In the medium or longer run, however, inflation 
will increase while unemployment will again reach its former level. (It might even be some-
what higher than before.)  
Actually, the political (experimental) demonstration of the Phillips-curve has failed. In the 
seventies and eighties, prices went on rising along with unemployment. The reason for this 
failure was due to the fact that such a policy relies on the money illusion of the economic 
agents. But this could only be successful in the long run if the economic agents could be 
fooled systematically and permanently. This does not seem to be very plausible, it also con-
tradicts the rationality assumption. Today, the necessity of a microeconomic basis is accepted 
quite generally in economics.  
                                                           
 24. See for this, e.g., H. RAMSER (1987, p. 8 ff.), as well as F. MACHLUP (1963) and E. SCHLICHT (1977). 
 25. For this and the respective criticism see A.M. SANTAMERO and J.J. SEATER (1978) as well as the discussion 
between R.G. KING and M.W. WATSON (1994) and CH.L. EVANS (1994). – 9 – 
As stated above, the weak rationality principle is an important one, but still only one ingredi-
ent of any model in the ‘understanding’ social sciences. The other ones are the assumptions 
about the information used by the agents about the content of the utility function. These two 
ingredients are to be discussed next.  
3 Bounded  Rationality 
Traditional economic theory assumed that economic agents are always fully informed and 
able to immediately process the available information. This view which today is still kept in 
many (introductory) microeconomic textbooks has not only (correctly) been criticised by 
many outsiders but has also been challenged from two sides: (i) Starting with G. STIGLER 
(1961) an economics of information has been developed which took into account that many if 
not most interesting microeconomic problems arise in situations with asymmetric informa-
tion. (ii) Already six years earlier, H.A. SIMON (1955) developed his concept of ‘bounded 
rationality.
26) In his approach, the individual behaves as a ‘satisficer’ and not as an optimiser, 
he searches so long among the alternatives at his disposal until he meets a ‘sufficiently’ ac-
ceptable one, and then decides in favour of that. If after a long search, however, no such alter-
native can be found, the individual reduces his aspiration level and then looks for an alterna-
tive which according to this lower level is acceptable. 
This model of bounded rational behaviour is often understood as an alternative to the eco-
nomic model of behaviour,
27) but this applies only insofar as oneself – as well as many critics, 
but also many traditional economists – is tied up to the concept of the individual who under 
full information is permanently optimising. Then both models can empirically be tested 
against each other.
28) When considering the more recent conception of the homo oeconomi-
cus, both these models are special cases of a more general concept, because H.A. SIMON’s 
model also contains those elements which are decisive for the economic model of behaviour: 
The distinction between preferences and restrictions, the evaluation (of a part) of the 
alternatives, the decision among the evaluated alternatives according to one’s relative ad-
vantage, and with that the possibility to influence this behaviour by a change in the environ-
mental conditions (incentives). 
Such concepts of bounded rationality are especially important if there is only little knowledge 
about the possible actions and above all about the consequences to be expected. In such situa-
tions, it is relevant to develop and to apply “rational search procedures”.
29) Such procedures 
should not in every single case, but at least on average, lead to decisions with acceptable re-
sults. They can be, e.g., approved rules of thumb, but also – in the computer era – highly 
                                                           
 26.  See for this also H.A. SIMON (1978, 1979), J. CONLISK (1996) as well as A. RUBINSTEIN (1998). 
 27. This view is adopted especially by H.A. SIMON himself, but it is also to be found with, e.g., R.A. HEINER 
(1983, p. 564). 
 28.  See for an example A. KAPTEYN, T. WANSBECK and J. BUYZE (1979). 
 29. H.A. SIMON (1978, p. 11). – 10 – 
complicated mathematical algorithms. In this context, H.A. SIMON speaks of “procedural ra-
tionality” (1978, p. 8), in contrast to the usually considered ‘substantial rationality’. 
How ‛boundedly’ rational the behaviour of individuals is, depends largely on the institutional 
conditions under which it takes place. Among other things, it is important how well the indi-
viduals are (and can be) informed about the alternatives at their disposal, the costs of addi-
tional information, and the return of such information, respectively the costs of ‘wrong’ or 
sub-optimal decisions. If the competitive pressure is high on a market, there is a strong incen-
tive to look for the objectively best action. But in monopolistic (or oligopolistic) situations, 
‘sufficiently adequate’ solutions might be acceptable. Something similar holds with respect to 
market transparency, if auction and non-auction markets are compared, if, e.g., the stock mar-
ket is compared with the market for consumer goods. It can generally be assumed that mar-
kets provide greater incentives for rational behaviour in the sense of the traditional model than 
other social decision mechanisms like, e.g., political or bureaucratic procedures. This may be 
the essential reason why many social scientists see the application of the economic model of 
behaviour restricted to the ‘economic’ area in the traditional sense. From what has been said 
above, it should be obvious that this is a misunderstanding, because a very specific and re-
strictive version of it is treated as equivalent with the economic model of behaviour. This, 
however, implies that boundedly rational behaviour is excluded from the realm of the theory 
of rational behaviour and is regarded as being non-rational or even irrational. Actually, how-
ever, this is one important variant of rational behaviour, just as the model of expected utility 
maximisation derived by J. V. NEUMANN and O. MORGENSTERN (1944). Bounded rational 
behaviour is rational and not irrational behaviour.
30) 
It may be objected against all this that in reality the behaviour of individuals is characterised 
less by rational (or bounded rational) decisions but more by their adherence to (social) norms, 
as it has been presented by R. DAHRENDORF (1958) in his picture of the ‘homo sociologicus’. 
This sociological model based on E. DURKHEIM’s (1895) tradition of a non-individualistic 
sociology or social sciences, is often opposed to the economic model as being the ‘more real-
istic one’.
31) But this comparison is questionable if it intends to express explicitly or implicitly 
that the homo oeconomicus does not follow rules. Of course, he also does do this, because in 
a world of limited information and limited resources it is rational to follow rules, at least in 
‘standard situations’. This is not only valid, e.g., in traffic, but applies also to many ‘eco-
nomic’ decisions in the traditional sense, e.g., to many consumer decisions.
32) The individual 
can also use ‘contingent rules’, i.e. rules which indicate for a whole class of situations how 
(according to his own preferences) to behave best. In any case, however, a reasonable indi-
                                                           
 30. According to this, H.A SIMON himself writes “that almost all human behavior has a large rational compo-
nent, but only in terms of the broader everyday sense of rationality, not the economists’ more specialized 
sense of maximization.” (1978, p. 2.) 
 31.  See for this G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1991), Chapters 5 and 9. 
 32. R.A. HEINER (1983, 1990) even adopts the view that (in many cases) behaviour is only then predictable if 
individuals do not strictly optimise because of their information problems, but orientate themselves by 
rules. For a critique of this proposition see G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1993a, pp. 188ff.). – 11 – 
vidual, whoever it may be, will hardly use such a rule blindly, but will change his behaviour 
as soon as he registers a relevant change of his acting conditions and possibly adapt his rule to 
the new situation. Of course, this also applies to contingent rules if a situation emerges which 
is not yet covered by them. If these rules are not seen absolutely, but as means being at the 
individual’s disposal to save decision and information costs, there is no contradiction between 
the rational choice model and the application of rules by the individuals. 
4 Self-Interest 
Basically, applying the weak rationality principle, the individual might strive for any aims. 
Technically (in economic terms) spoken, there is no restriction on the arguments in the indi-
vidual’s utility function. It is totally open. As mentioned above, the only additional assump-
tion is the consistency of the preferences at the moment of choice. When applying this model 
in economic theory, however, in addition it is usually assumed that the individuals act accord-
ing to their self-interest, or, in the terminology of J. RAWLS (1971, p. 144), that they are “mu-
tually disinterested rational”. This stronger assumption leads to a theory with greater empiri-
cal content which has been successfully applied to many, mostly economic, situations, but has 
also failed to provide a convincing explanation of other, mainly non-economic, situations. 
The most prominent one is the ‘paradox of participation’ which goes back to A. DOWNS 
(1957): A (purely) self-interested, rational voter should not participate in elections and refer-
enda. Nevertheless, we usually observe high participation rates. Thus, a theory which attempts 
to explain voter participation as rational action comes to the conclusion that the rational voter 
does not vote. 
It should first be taken into account that the assumption of self-interest is a separate one and 
not part of the (weak) rationality assumption. This holds as soon as the assumption of self-
interest implies additional restrictions of the individuals’ utility functions besides the consis-
tency-requirements. The usually applied restriction is that the utility functions contains only 
the ‘own’ arguments, i.e. that the well-being of other individuals is not a (direct) argument in 
the individual’s utility function. One should be careful to clearly differentiate between these 
two, the rationality and the self-interest assumption; the mixing of them, which is often found 
in the literature, has caused a lot of confusion. 
It has been argued that the economic model has little explanatory power without this assump-
tion but that with this assumption, because of contradictory evidence it has to be rejected 
when it is applied to many problems which are not economic ones (in the traditional sense). 
This holds, e.g., for problems of voting behaviour, because – as mentioned above – actual 
voting behaviour is not consistent with (purely) self-interested behaviour.
33)  
It is trivial that the economic model has less explanatory power without the assumption of 
self-interest than employing it. However, it should also be taken into account that there are 
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many situations in which the question of self-interest or altruism is of secondary importance 
for the analysis. If certain alternatives become more attractive and others less, we can assume 
that individuals will shift their behaviour towards the now (relatively) more attractive alterna-
tives. There are only the changes of restrictions which matter here as long as the preferences 
and with them the motives of acting people remain constant. E.g., essential statements of the 
economic theory of politics can be maintained if altruism and not self-interest is presumed 
with individuals.
34) The decisive assumption in these situations is that of rationality and not 
that of self-interest.
35) On the other hand, as the empirical evidence shows, self-interest plays 
an important role for the behaviour of individuals in economic but also in many non-
economic decision situations.  
There are at least three phenomena which are empirically well established but not consistent 
with the assumption of narrow self-interest as defined above: altruism, reciprocity, and com-
mitment. If, according to A.K. SEN (1977, p. 95), “one way of defining commitment is in 
terms of a person choosing an act that he believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare 
to him than an alternative that is also available to him”, in all three cases the individuals im-
pose costs upon themselves which do not directly affect their individual welfare. In the case 
of altruism it has a direct positive impact on other individuals. In the case of reciprocity this 
might be positive or negative depending on the previous action of the other individual; the 
really interesting case is the one of negative reciprocity when the individual incurs costs in 
order to punish another individual.
36) Following the above definition in the case of commit-
ment this is open: A person might be committed to a behaviour which benefits somebody else, 
a behaviour which hurts other people, but also to a behaviour which does not affect other 
people at all. Insofar, altruism and reciprocity might be seen as being special cases of com-
mitment. 
It has been shown how altruism, reciprocity, or moral behaviour can be incorporated into eco-
nomic models of utility maximisation subject to constraints.
37) There is also no problem to 
formalise commitment along these lines. The only problem is how to specify the utility func-
tion. This does not touch the (weak) rationality assumption at all. There is, e.g., no conflict 
between morality and rationality. Moreover, the ‛rational fool’ can be considered as being a 
fool,
38) but he is not a fool because of his rationality, but because of the special structure of his 
utility function (including his high discount rate).  
                                                           
 34.  See for this G. BRENNAN and J. PINCUS (1987) responding to J. QUIGGIN (1987). 
 35. A.A. ALCHIAN (1950) presents a much more pointed argument according to which individual motivations 
are completely irrelevant because of the selection pressure in competitive markets. This holds, however, at 
best if there is very strong competition. See for this G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1991), Section 8.3. 
 36. Positive reciprocity, as, e.g., in the case of tit for tat, is in the (long-run) self interest of the individual and, 
therefore, not at odds with the usual assumptions which are employed in economic models.  
 37. For altruism see, e.g., J. ANDREONI (1988, 1989, 1990), for reciprocity E. FEHR and S. GÄCHTER (1998, 
2000), for moral behaviour G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2002, 2003).  
 38. See A.K. SEN (1977). – 13 – 
One might question whether it is appropriate to integrate these kinds of behaviour into the 
(standard) economic model, in order to make “more room for other regarding preferences in 
the formulation of rational choice” (A.K. SEN (1994, p. 389)). The fact that moral phenomena 
can be accommodated within utility theory does not yet imply that it is appropriate to analyse 
the phenomena at hand by this way.
39) But this is a question of appropriateness and not of 
possibility. The use of models based on this ‛economic’ framework allows to deduce testable 
hypotheses about which conditions are favourable for other regarding behaviour.
40) The theo-
retical and empirical literature about voter participation which, since W.H. RIKER and P.C. 
ORDESHOOK (1968), includes moral behaviour into a standard economic model can serve as a 
good example.
41) Moreover, it remains open how an alternative representation in a formal 
model should look like. Or should one totally dismiss formal models in this context? Finally, 
even if (standard) utility theory is not applied, it remains that the acting individuals have ob-
jectives, a perception of the alternatives which are available to them and that we have to apply 
the weak rationality principle in order to understand their behaviour.  
5  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The weak rationality principle is a heuristic principle which is guiding any ‛understanding’ 
social science in the Weberian sense. It has no empirical content and can, therefore, not be 
rejected for empirical reasons. It could, however, be rejected for practical reasons if, e.g., fol-
lowing another heuristic principle would lead to ‛better’ insights into social relations, would 
lead to a more fruitful theory of the society. Whether this is the case or not is not the topic of 
this paper, even if it is difficult to imagine an alternative which would generally outperform 
the general rational choice model. This does not imply that other models do not have advan-
tages in explaining some phenomena. 
Tests are principally (and often rather easily) possible if assumptions are added which specify 
the preferences and/or the available information in more detail, i.e. if additional hypotheses 
are added to the weak rationality principle. This holds, e.g., for the various tests of rational 
expectations.
42) But then ‘combined hypotheses’ are tested, and it is hardly possible to decide 
whether (in case of a failure) the assumption of rationality and with it the behavioural model 
or (one of) the additional special assumption(s) has to be rejected.
43) 
                                                           
 39. D.M. HAUSMAN und M. S. MCPHERSON (1996, p. 53) argue “that some moral phenomena cannot be ac-
commodated within utility theory.”  
 40. See, e.g., G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1992). 
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 42. See, e.g., G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1993). 
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One advantage of applying the (weak) rationality principle is that it makes two seemingly 
contradictory views compatible: the assumption of a free will and the predictability of human 
behaviour. For predicting the behaviour of an individual it does not matter whether he follows 
a deterministic law or rationally decides to behave in a certain way.
44) Ex post we can, of 
course, try to understand any behaviour. This does, however, not necessarily help to predict 
future behaviour. In order to do the latter, we have to construct models which represent the 
typical situation in which the individual is, the “situational logic” in terms of K.R. POPPER 
(1972, p. 102). Because, however, individual decisions also depend on many factors which 
cannot be explicitly included into our micro-models, the rationality principle is ex ante more 
useful to predict aggregate compared to individual behaviour, provided that the individual 
‛deviations’ of the solution proposed by the model cancel out each other. 
Finally, the weak rationality principle is also compatible with the idea of hierarchical prefer-
ence orderings. Problems like the ‘weakness of the will’ and the observation that individuals 
deliberately restrict their future action leeway in order to reach certain goals cannot be han-
dled within the traditional economic framework.
45) To do so, it has to be assumed that indi-
viduals have two kinds of preferences, which are ordered.
46) On the lower level are the prefer-
ences which are given in daily life and according to which the individual has to decide in con-
crete situations. The preferences on the upper level describe how the individual would like to 
see himself acting. Both preference orderings can be consistent; but contradictions can exist 
between the two orderings.
47) As long as no concrete actions are necessary, the individual 
might ‘plan’ according to his upper preferences, and he can try to influence the restrictions 
which later will come up in concrete situations, to make sure that despite following the lower 
preferences the actual behaviour will – as far as possible – be consistent with his upper pref-
erence ordering. 
The idea of two different and partly contradictory preference orderings might seem strange at 
first; for it is unfamiliar at least for the economist who is used assuming unambiguous (and 
fixed) preferences of the individuals. This does not hold for the philosophical tradition. There, 
the idea can be traced back at least to ARISTOTLE and his “Nicomachean Ethics“, where he 
speaks of two different parts of the soul where “the part of the soul that has a rational princi-
ple stands to the irrational part“, and he sees the relation between these two parts as “between 
ruler and ruled.“
48) And H.G. FRANKFURT (1971) argues that the existence of superior prefer-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
age of the assumption of rational behaviour on a prescriptive and descriptive purpose see also A.K. SEN 
(1987)). 
 44.  See for this M. LAGUEUX (2004, p. 32). 
 45. A whole series of examples of self-restraints are given by T.C. SCHELLING (1984). Many of those examples 
are from everyday life.  
 46. See for this also T.C. SCHELLING (1978, 1980), A.K. SEN (1977), J. ELSTER (1986), as well as R.H. THALER 
and H.M. SHEFRIN (1981). 
 47. Such contradictions are especially obvious if addicts try to fight their addiction. 
 48. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, 1138b. – 15 – 
ences and the possibility of using them for judging the subordinated ones is a precondition to 
see human beings as ‘persons’ with a free will because for this it is necessary that they are 
conscious of their will and that they can reflect about it. This exactly happens if individuals 
are trying to bind themselves. 
Thus, as its application in economics has shown, the weak rationality principle is a very use-
ful methodological guidance which can also be applied outside the economic area. Which 
additional assumptions have to be or should be made depends on the area of application. 
Whether it is fruitful in these applications mainly depends on the fruitfulness of the competing 
approaches available: those which are not within the framework of an ‛understanding’ social 
science.  – 16 – 
References 
B. ABEL (1983), Grundlagen der Erklärung menschlichen Handelns, Mohr (Siebeck), Tübingen 1983. 
H. ALBERT (1964) Der Mythos der totalen Vernunft: Dialektische Ansprüche im Lichte undialekti-
scher Kritik, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 16 (1964), pp. 225 – 256. 
A.A. ALCHIAN (1950), Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy 
58 (1950), pp. 211 – 221. 
M. ALLAIS (1953), Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant risque: Critique des postulats et 
axiomes de l’école Américaine, Econometrica 21 (1953), pp. 503 – 546; extended English version: 
The Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving Risk and a Criticism of the Postulate 
and Axioms of the American School, in: M. ALLAIS and O. HAGEN (eds.), Expected Utility Hy-
potheses and the Allais Paradox, Reidel, Dordrecht 1979, pp. 27 – 145. 
J. ANDREONI (1988), Privately Produced Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism, 
Journal of Public Economics 35 (1988), pp. 57 – 73. 
J. ANDREONI (1989), Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equiva-
lence, Journal of Political Economy 97 (1989), pp. 1447 – 1458. 
J. ANDREONI (1990), Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm Glow Giv-
ing, Economic Journal 100 (1990), pp. 464 – 477. 
E. ANGEHRN (1983), Handlungserklärung und Rationalität, Zur Methodologie Max Webers, Zeit-
schrift für philosophische Forschung 37 (1983), pp. 341 – 362. 
K.J. ARROW (1986), Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System, Journal of Business 59 
(1986), pp. 385 – 399. 
G.S. BECKER (1962), Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy 70 
(1962), pp. 1 – 13. 
G. BRENNAN and J. PINCUS (1987), Rational Actor Theory in Politics: A Critical Review of John 
Quiggin, The Economic Record 63 (1987), pp. 22 – 32. 
A. BÜHLER (1987), Die Einheit der wissenschaftlichen Methode und Maximen des Verstehens, Zeit-
schrift für philosophische Forschung 41 (1987), pp. 633 – 644. 
M. BUNGE (1959), Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1959. 
J. CONLISK (1996), Why Bounded Rationality? Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1996), pp. 669 – 
700. 
R. DAHRENDORF (1958), Homo Sociologicus: Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der 
Kategorie der sozialen Rolle, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 10 (1958), 
pp. 178 – 208; English translation: Homo Sociologicus: On the History, Significance, and Limits of 
the Category of Social Role, in: R. DAHRENDORF Essays in the Theory of Society, Stanford Univer-
sity Press, Stanford 1968, pp. 19 – 87. 
A. DOWNS (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, New York 1957. 
E. DURKHEIM (1895), Les régles de la méthode sociologique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 
1895; English translation: The Rules of Sociological Method, The Free Press, Glencoe (Ill.) 1938. 
J. ELSTER (1979), Ulysses and the Sirens, Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge 1979. 
J. ELSTER(ed.) (1986), The Multiple Self, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986. 
H. ESSER (1996), Die Definition der Situation, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 
48 (1996), pp. 1 – 34. 
CH.L. EVANS (1994), The Post-War U.S. Phillips Curve: A Comment, Carnegie-Rochester Confer-
ence Series on Public Policy 41 (1994), pp. 221 – 230. – 17 – 
E. FEHR und S. GÄCHTER (1998), Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of 
Homo Reciprocans, European Economic Review 42 (1998), S. 845 – 859.  
E. FEHR und S. GÄCHTER (2000), Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000), Heft 3, S. 159 – 181.  
E. FEHR und J.-R. TYRAN (2001), Does Money Illusion Matter?, American Economic Review; 91 
(2001), pp. 1239 – 1262. 
H.G. FRANKFURT (1971), Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Journal of Philosophy 68 
(1971), pp. 5 – 20. 
D.P. GREEN and I. SHAPIRO (1994), Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in 
Political Science, Yale University Press, New Haven 1994. 
J. HABERMAS (1964), Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus: Erwiderung eines Pamph-
lets, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 16 (1964), pp. 636 – 659. 
D.W. HANDS (1985), Karl Popper and Economic Methodology, Economics and Philosophy 1 (1985), 
pp. 63 – 99. 
D.M. HAUSMAN und M. S. MCPHERSON (1996), Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (U.K.) 1996. 
F.A. v. HAYEK (1952), The Counter Revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason, The Free 
Press, Glencoe 1952. 
R.A. HEINER (1983), The Origin of Predictable Behavior, American Economic Review 73 (1983), pp. 
560 – 595. 
R.A. HEINER (1990), Rule Governed Behavior in Evolution and Human Society, Constitutional Politi-
cal Economy 1 (1990), pp. 19 – 46. 
J.R. HICKS (1939), Value and Capital, An Inquiry into Some Fundamental Principles of Economic 
Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1939. (2
nd edition 1946.) 
A. KAPTEYN, T. WANSBECK and J. BUYZE (1979), Maximizing or Satisficing?, The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 61 (1979), pp. 549 – 563. 
R.G. KING and M.W. WATSON (1994), The Post-War U.S. Phillips Curve, Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference Series on Public Policy 41 (1994), pp. 157 – 219. 
G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1985), Rationales Verhalten und vernünftiges Handeln, ein Widerspruch?, in: H. 
MILDE and H.G.  MONISSEN (eds.), Rationale Wirtschaftspolitik in komplexen Gesellschaften, 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1985, pp. 29 – 41. 
G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1991), Homo oeconomicus, Das ökonomische Modell individuellen Verhaltens 
und seine Anwendung in den Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, J.B.C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
Tübingen 1991; 2
nd edition 2000. 
G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1992), Towards a Theory of Low-Cost Decisions, European Journal of Political 
Economy 8 (1992), pp. 305 – 320. 
G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1993), Hält sich der Homo oeconomicus an Regeln?, Einige Bemerkungen zur 
Rolle von Normen und Regeln im Rahmen der Konzeption des ökonomischen Verhaltensmodells, 
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 12 (1993), pp. 181 – 197. 
G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1993a), Testing Weak Rationality of Forecasts with Different Time Horizons, 
Journal of Forecasting 12 (1993), pp. 541 – 558. 
G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2002), On the Role of Heroes in Political and Economic Processes, Kyklos 55 
(2002), S. 179 – 196. 
G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2003), On Minimal Morals, mimeo, University of St. Gallen, March 2003. 
H. KLIEMT (1984), Nicht-explanative Funktionen eines ‛Homo oeconomicus’ und Beschränkungen 
seiner explanativen Rolle, in: M.J. HOLLER (ed.), Homo oeconomicus II, München 1984. 
M. LAGUEUX (2004), The Forgotten Role of the Rationality Principle in Economics, Journal of Eco-
nomic Methodology 11 (2004), pp. 31 – 51. – 18 – 
S.J. LATSIS (1983), The Role and Status of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences, in: R.S. 
COHEN and M.W. WARTOFSKY (eds.), Epistemology, Methodology and the Social Sciences, Reidel 
Publishing Company, Dordrecht/Boston 1983, pp. 123 – 151. 
F. MACHLUP (1963), Micro- and Macroeconomics, Contested Boundaries and Claims of Superiority, 
in: F. MACHLUP, Essays an Economic Semantics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1963, pp. 97 – 
144. 
C. MENGER (1883), Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der politischen 
Ökonomie insbesondere, Duncker und Humblot, Leipzig 1883; English translation: Problems of 
Economics and Sociology, University of Illinois Press, Urbana 1963. 
J.E. MUTH  (1961), Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, Econometrica 29 
(1961), pp. 315 – 335. 
J. V. NEUMANN and O. MORGENSTERN (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1944. 
D.C. NORTH (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, Norton, New York 1981. 
B.M.  PATZAK (1984), Rationalmodell und analytische Handlungstheorie, in: M.J.  HOLLER (ed.), 
Homo oeconomicus III, München 1984, pp. 7 – 42. 
A.W. PHILLIPS (1958), The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage 
Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861 – 1957, Economica 25 (1958), pp. 283 – 299. 
K.R. POPPER (1962), Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozi-
alpsychologie 14 (1962), pp. 233 – 248. 
K.R. POPPER (1967), La rationalité et le statut du principe de rationalité, in E.M. CLASSEN (ed.), Les 
fondements philosophiques des systèmes économiques: Textes de Jaques Rueff et essais rédigés en 
son honneur, Payot, Paris 1966, pp. 142 – 150; English translation: The Rationality Principle, re-
printed in: B.J. CALDWELL (ed.), The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics, Volume III, Ed-
ward Elgar, Aldershot 1993, pp. 3 – 11. 
K.R. POPPER (1972), Objective Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
J. QUIGGIN (1987), Egoistic Rationality and Public Choice: A Critical Review of Theory and Evi-
dence, The Economic Record 63 (1987), pp. 10 – 21. 
H. RAMSER (1987), Beschäftigung und Konjunktur, Springer, Berlin 1987. 
J. RAWLS (1971), A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1971. 
W.H. RIKER and P.C. ORDESHOOK (1968), A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, American Political 
Science Review 62 (1968), pp. 25 – 42. 
A. RUBINSTEIN (1998), Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1998. 
P.A. SAMUELSON and R.M. SOLOW (1960), Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy, American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 50.2 (1960), pp. 177 – 194. 
A.M. SANTAMERO and J.J. SEATER (1978), The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-off: A Critique of the 
Literature, Journal of Economic Literature 16 (1978), pp. 499 – 544. 
T.C. SCHELLING (1978), Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings 68.2 (1978), pp. 290 – 294. 
T.C. SCHELLING (1980), The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, Public Interest 60 (1980), pp. 94 – 
118. 
T.C. SCHELLING (1984), Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74.2 (1984), pp. 1 – 11. 
E. SCHLICHT (1977), Grundlagen der ökonomischen Analyse, Rowohlt, Hamburg 1977. 
M. SCHMID (1979), Handlungsrationalität, Kritik einer dogmatischen Handlungswissenschaft, Wil-
helm Fink, München 1979. 
M. SCHMID (1979a), Rationalitätsprinzip und Handlungserklärung, in: H. LENK (ed.), Handlungstheo-
rien-interdisziplinär, Vol. 2.1., Wilhelm Fink, München 1979, pp. 491 – 533. – 19 – 
P.J.H. SCHOEMAKER (1982), The Expected Utility Modell: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limi-
tations, Jorunal of Economic Literature 20 (1982), pp. 529 – 563. 
G. SCHURZ (ed.) (1988), Erklären und Verstehen in der Wissenschaft, Oldenbourg, München 1988. 
J.A. SCHUMPETER (1954), History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, New York 1954. 
J.R. SEARLE (2001), The Classical Model of Rationality and Its Weaknesses, in: J.R. SEARLE, Ration-
ality in Action, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 2001, pp. 1 – 32. 
R. SELTEN (1990), Bounded Rationality, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (JITE) 146 
(1990), pp. 649 – 658. 
A.K. SEN (1977), Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976/77), pp. 317 – 344. 
A.K. SEN (1987), Rational Behaviour, in: The New Palgrave, A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4, 
Macmillan, London 1987, pp. 68 – 76; cited from the reprint in: F. HAHN and M. HOLLIS (eds.), 
Philosophy and Economic Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1979, pp. 87 – 109. 
A.K. SEN (1994), The Formulation of Rational Choice, American Economic Review, Papers and Pro-
ceedings 84.2 (1994), pp. 385  – 390. 
A.K. SEN and B. WILLIAMS (1982), Introduction, in: A.K. SEN, and B. WILLIAMS (eds), Utilitarian-
ism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (England) et al. 1982, pp. 1 – 21. 
H.A. SIMON (1955), A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 
(1955), pp. 99 – 118. 
H.A. SIMON (1978), Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings 68.2 (1978), pp. 1 – 16. 
H.A. SIMON (1979), Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, American Economic Re-
view 69 (1979), pp. 493 – 513. 
W. STEGMÜLLER (1960), Das Problem der Kausalität, in: E. TOPITSCH (ed.), Probleme der Wissen-
schaftstheorie, Festschrift für Viktor Kraft, Springer, Wien 1960, pp. 171 – 190. 
W. STEGMÜLLER (1969), Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und analytischen Phi-
losophie, Band I, Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung, Springer, Berlin 1969. 
G. STIGLER (1961), The Economics of Information, Journal of Political Economy 69 (1961), pp. 213 – 
225. 
R. SUDGEN (1985), Why Be Consistent? A Critical Analysis of Consistency Requirements in choice 
Theory, Economica 52 (1985), pp. 167 – 183. 
R.H. THALER (1992), The Winner’s Curse, Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life, The Free 
Press, New York 1992. 
R.H. THALER and H.M. SHEFRIN (1981), An Economic Theory of Self-Control, Journal of Political 
Economy 89 (1981), pp. 392 – 406. 
M. TIETZEL (1981), Die Rationalitätsannahme in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften, oder: Der homo oe-
conomicus und seine Verwandten, Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft 32 (1981), pp. 115 – 138. 
V. VANBERG (1975), Die zwei Soziologien, Mohr (Siebeck), Tübingen 1975. 
V. VANBERG (2004), The Rationality Postulate in Economics: Its Ambiguity, Its Deficiency and Its 
Evolutionary Alternative, Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (2004), pp. 1 – 29. 
J.W.N. WATKINS (1970), Imperfect Rationality, in: R. BORGER and F. CIOFFI (eds.), Explanation in 
the Behavioural Sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970, pp. 167 – 217, 228 – 230. 
M. WEBER (1922), Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Mohr (Siebeck), Tübingen 1922; English translation: 
Economics and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Badminster Press, New York 1968. 
 